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THE USE OF FEDERAL LAW TO CURB EXCESSIVE EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION: LESSONS IN PAST FAILURES
AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
KATHRYN J. KENNEDY*
I. INTRODUCTION
WHEN one thinks of the use of legislative power to curb the size andthe type of compensation paid to executives, one normally thinks
such power is reserved to the states.  That is, one tends to think that regu-
lating corporate governance falls within traditional state police powers.
However, while state courts have been willing to review the processes boards
of directors use in setting the size and type of executive compensation,
they have been less willing to review the actual results of such decisions.1
Hence, it is no shock that Congress continues to dabble in the area of
corporate governance in order to have an impact on the size and type of
executive compensation, especially with the recent meltdown of the finan-
cial institutions.
This Article begins with a discussion of Congress’s use of the Internal
Revenue Code (“I.R.C.” or the “Code”)2 over the past century to impinge
upon and change corporate behavior, particularly in the area of executive
compensation.  Such a tactic is not startling due to the potential power of
taxation over executives and corporations, and the recent congressional
requirement that legislative initiatives be deficit-neutral in the totality.3
* Kathryn J. Kennedy is a professor of law at The John Marshall Law School
and Associate Dean for Advanced Studies and Research.  This article is a
continuation of the dialogue raised in a previous article by Professor Kennedy,
Excessive Executive Compensation: Prior Federal Attempts to Curb Perceived Abuses, 10
HOUS. BUS. & TAX. L.J. 196 (2010).  The material in this Article was presented at
the Villanova Law Review Norman J. Shachoy Symposium, U.S. Taxation of Offshore
Activity, and Regulating Executive Compensation, held on Sept. 23, 2011.
1. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 705 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).  Here, the court focused on process instead
of results.  The case involved a shareholder derivative suit alleging that the board
of directors committed waste and breached its fiduciary duties by approving an
employment agreement of a proposed president of the company without full dis-
closure of its terms and conditions, including a non-fault termination clause that
could result in a hefty severance package. Id.  As the court was reluctant to judge
the board’s decision made ten years earlier in light of current “notions of best
practices,” it found in favor of the defendants.  Id. at 697.  Upon appeal to the
Delaware Supreme Court, the court affirmed as the shareholders had failed to
rebut the business judgment presumption, which focused on the quality of the
board’s process rather than the quality of its decision. See In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 56 (Del. 2006).
2. The Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C., may be referred to as the “Code” in
the text and will appear abbreviated as I.R.C.
3. See Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(codified in scattered sections of titles 2 and 15 of the U.S.C.).  Here, Congress
(551)
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However, Congress’s use of the Code has failed in this regard, resulting in
further complexity of the Code4 and unintended consequences.
As a result, we have seen a shift in the last decade on the part of
Congress to use federal securities law to enact corporate governance rules,
which focus the public spotlight on executive compensation.  Congress
hopes to cause public outrage over the size and type of executive compen-
sation, resulting in a shift in the corporate culture.  It is not unforeseen
that Congress has used the federal tax code and the federal securities law
to regulate in this area—the Code gets to the pocketbook of the executive
and the corporation whereas the securities law uses disclosure and trans-
parency to focus on the corporation’s actions.  Whether the use of securi-
ties law will be successful or not is too early to tell.
II. HOW ARE EXECUTIVES PAID?
Before beginning a discussion about executive compensation, it is im-
portant to distinguish between the pay package that the typical employee
receives and that which the typical executive receives.5  The typical em-
ployee is paid with salary, perhaps a year-end bonus, maybe overtime pay
(if hourly), and benefits (e.g., health, retirement, severance, life insur-
ance, and disability insurance).  The predominant portion of the total pay
package for the typical employee is their salary.  The typical executive’s
pay package is poles apart:6
mandated that direct spending and tax legislation be deficit-neutral in the totality.
Id.  The result has been massive procedural roadblocks to initiating tax relief legis-
lation. See JIM SAXTON, J. ECON. COMM., EXTENDING THE BUDGET ENFORCEMENT
ACT: REVISIONS OF PAYGO RULES NECESSARY FOR BETTER TAX POLICY 3 (2002).
4. See I.R.C. § 7803(c)(2)(B) (2006) (requiring National Advocate to provide
annual reports to Congress as to any legislative Code amendments).  In 2001, the
Joint Committee on Taxation surmised that there are in excess of 1,395,000 words
in the Code. Id.  Another study approximated the number to be 2.1 million by
2005, triple the number in 1975. See Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, The Complexity of
the Tax Code, 28 NEWS Q., Spring 2009, at 12, 12.
5. See David J. Lynch, Widening U.S. Income Gap Could Have Far-Reaching Effect,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 2, 2011, at 3 (noting that distribution of U.S. incomes since 1968
has become less equally distributed).  Using the Gini coefficient, which acts as a
distributional measure, ranging from zero (each individual has equal share of in-
come) to one (one person owns all income), Lynch states that the U.S. Gini score
has risen to 0.47 in 2010 from 0.39 in 1968. Id.  The thirty-nation Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development remarks that the rich-poor divide has
increased by twenty percent since the mid-1980s, higher than any other developed
nation. Id.  In the article, the author quotes Raghuram Rajan, the IMF’s former
chief economist, who criticizes countries with high levels of inequality as they con-
tribute to “ineffective economic policies.” Id.  This could account for the inaction
in Washington D.C. Id.
6. See Sarah Anderson et al., Executive Excess 2011: The Massive CEO Rewards for
Tax Dodging, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.ips-dc.
org/reports/executive_excess_2011_the_massive_ceo_rewards_for_tax_dodging
(noting that in 2010, major corporate CEOs had compensation 325 times pay of
America’s average worker).
2
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• The executive is paid a base salary, which amounts to about 10% of
the overall pay package according to the 2010 Wall Street Journal
(WSJ) and Hay Group CEO Compensation study;7
• There may be signing bonuses and undoubtedly short-term bo-
nuses (which could be based on meeting individual or group incen-
tive goals), which can amount to around 20% of the overall pay
package according to the study;8
• There are long-term incentive pay awards in the form of stock op-
tions, restricted stock units, phantom stock awards, or stock appre-
ciation rights (“SARs”), which can amount to about 60% of the
overall pay package, according to the study.9 These benefits are tied
to performance either by the executive, the employer, or both;
• There are qualified and nonqualified benefits, which can provide
the same retirement, medical, insurance, severance, and disability
benefits extended to the general employee community, as well as
enhanced benefits that cannot be paid through those plans due to
maximum limitations and nondiscrimination requirements im-
posed by the Code; and
• Finally there can be perquisites unavailable to the typical employee
community but extended to executives (e.g., use of corporate air-
crafts, club memberships, personal loans at favorable interest rates,
relocation expenses, enhanced health benefits and executive physi-
cals, and tax gross-ups (i.e., additional taxes owed by the executive
because of the specific compensation that is paid by the
corporation)).10
7. The Wall Street Journal/Hay Group Survey of CEO Compensation, WALL ST. J.
(May 8, 2011), http://graphicsweb.wsj.com/php/CEOPAY11.html.  This study ex-
amines 350 U.S. public companies that filed proxies between May 1, 2010 and
April 30, 2011. Id.  The median CEO base salary was $1,127,363 as compared to
the median CEO total direct salary of $9,271,865. Id.
8. See id.  The median total CEO annual cash award was $3,354,950, which
included a base salary of $1,127,363, as compared to a median CEO total direct
salary of $9,271,865. Id.
9. See id.  Median long term CEO incentives were $6,234,834 as compared to
the median CEO total compensation of $10,273,500. Id.  The option of equity-
based awards goes further than the basic compensation strategy.  These options
have different implications such as: accounting and financial reporting issues, tax-
related issues (for the employer and the employee), SEC disclosure requirements,
as well as the possible impact on the company’s stock.  Analyst Michael Brush re-
ported that three of the most overpaid CEOs during 2010 were: Philippe Dauman
of Viacom, who earned $84.5 million; Larry Ellison of Oracle, who earned $70
million; and John Hammergren of McKesson, who earned $54.4 million.  Michael
Brush, CEOs Got a Big Raise; How About You?, MSN MONEY (May 30, 2011), http://
money.ca.msn.com/investing/michael-brush/ceos-got-a-big-raise-how-about-you.
10. See Executive Perquisites: A Changing Landscape, HAY GROUP, http://hay
groupnews.com/ve/7460r88LsB63Zbk6/VT=0/page=4 (last visited Mar. 16, 2012)
(taking selection of 200 companies with revenues over $5 billion).  “All but nine of
the companies disclosed that they provided at least one perk to their executives.”
Id.  Six of the companies provided no perquisites, whereas three companies noted
no perquisites below the aggregate value mandated to be revealed. Id.  The WSJ
3
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Since the base pay is an insignificant part of the executive’s overall pay
package and is usually unrelated to the executive’s or company’s perform-
ance, Congress has largely targeted the short-term and long-term incentive
components paid to executives, as well as the use of retirement benefits
and severance benefits.
There has been a lot of commentary as to why executive compensa-
tion has increased exponentially over the past decades in comparison to
the typical employee’s compensation.  There are a number of answers to
that question, including: changes in the federal income tax legislation (as
will be discussed later in the Article);11 increased use of stock options as
long term incentives due to their initial favorable accounting treatment
and the employer’s view that such awards were a low-cost method of com-
pensation;12 decreases in the maximum limitations on benefits and contri-
butions under qualified retirement plans, resulting in more benefits in
nonqualified retirement plans to make the executive “whole” with respect
to such benefits;13 and external corporate hiring—as opposed to inter-
nal—which generally results in higher pay packages to “make whole” the
executive as to benefits left behind with the prior employer.14
III. USE OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX CODE
This next section will review, in chronological order of enactment,
congressional use of the Code to curb the level of executive compensation
and influence the type of executive compensation—all with unintended
consequences.  The section will begin with I.R.C. § 162(a) enacted in 1918
and proceed to § 280G and § 4999 enacted in 1984 and 1986, respectively,
§ 162(m) enacted in 1993, § 409A enacted in 2004, and end with § 457A
enacted in 2008.
A. I.R.C. § 162(a)
I.R.C. § 162(a) permits business entities to take a deduction for both
“ordinary and necessary” business expenses, and for reasonable salaries
study done in 2009 calculated that the most common perquisites given to the exec-
utives were: corporate jets (66%), financial planning (58%), company autos
(52%), tax gross-ups (46%), and executive physical exams (40%). Id. Due to pres-
sure from institutional investors and shareholders, companies now analyze execu-
tive perquisites to make sure there is a link between these perquisites and
corporate performance. Id.
11. See Michael C. Jensen et al., Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to
Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 28 (European Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=56
1305.
12. See id. at 39.
13. Thomas Veal & Laura T. Morrison, SERP Shifts and Sec. 409A, The Free
Library, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SERP+shifts+and+Sec.+409A.-a0160760
183 (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
14. See Jensen et al., supra note 11, at 34.
4
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paid for personal services rendered.15  This same standard is used for justi-
fying the deduction of deferred compensation payments for executives,
even though that deduction may be deferred in time.
Assuming that services have been rendered, the issue of “reasonable-
ness” is then raised in order for the entity to claim the deduction.16  This
issue will later become critically important to privately held or closely held
entities as the Code will continue to impose a “reasonableness” standard
on all base pay, which is not subject to the $1 million cap imposed under
I.R.C. § 162(m), as will be discussed later in the Article.17  The Internal
Revenue Service (the “Service”) uses an objective test.18  The IRS Revenue
Manual lists twelve different factors in ascertaining reasonableness.19  The
courts have fashioned as many as twenty-one factors,20 resulting in a case-
by-case analysis.21  That fact-intensive analysis has made it harder for the
Service to audit and track.
15. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2009).  This standard was added by the
Revenue Act of 1918.  Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919). I.R.C. § 404 has a
comparable standard for deferred compensation. I.R.C. §§ 162, 404 (2006 &
Supp. 2009).
16. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7 (2009).
17. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13211(a), 107 Stat. 312, 469–70 (inserting new subsection (m) into I.R.C. § 162
for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 1994).
18. See id.  Such amount would ordinarily be paid for like services by like en-
terprises under like circumstances.
19. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.35.2.5.2.2
(2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-035-002.html#d0e212
(stating relevant factors for ascertaining reasonableness as: nature of employee’s
duties, background, expertise, and knowledge of business; size of employer; em-
ployee’s contribution to employer’s profitability; time spent with employer; local
and general economic conditions; employee’s character and extent of responsibil-
ity; when compensation is determined; relationship between shareholder’s com-
pensation to stockholdings; whether compensation is in full or in part for assets
purchased; and comparison of amount paid by similarly situated employers to simi-
lar employees for comparable services).
20. See Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949) (listing
eight factors).  These factors are:
[T]he nature, extent and scope of the employee’s work; the size and com-
plexities of the business; a comparison of salaries paid with the gross in-
come and the net income; the prevailing general economic
conditions; . . . the salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees; and in
the case of small corporations with a limited number of officers the
amount of compensation paid to the particular employee in previous
years.
Id.; see also Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 1241, 1245–47 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating
five factors); Kennedy, Jr. v. Comm’r, 671 F.2d 167, 173–74 (6th Cir. 1982) (listing
twelve factors); Edwin’s, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.2d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 1974)
(documenting seven factors); Trucks, Inc. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 638,
642–43 (D. Neb. 1984) (giving fifteen factors); Diverse Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 51
T.C.M. (CCH) 525, at *17 n.3 (1986); Foos v. Comm’r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 863, at
*58–59 (1981).
21. See Perlmutter v. Comm’r, 373 F.2d 45, 47 (10th Cir. 1967).
5
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The courts, especially the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, have also
raised the issue of whether courts should decide what constitutes reasona-
ble compensation.22  The end result, however, is that denying the deduc-
tion simply hurts the employer—instead of the executive—and thus has
little impact on reducing the size of executive compensation.  This obvi-
ously depends on the extent to which the employer and executive agree to
share the lost deduction.  But, I.R.C. § 162(a)’s overall application to curb
the size of executive compensation has been largely ineffectual.
B. I.R.C. §§ 280G and 4999
Due to the outbreak of mergers and acquisitions in the early 1980s,
Congress perceived that executives were being unduly protected by en-
hanced severance packages that were payable in the event of a hostile take-
over.23  A corporation’s board of directors guaranteed these enhanced
severance packages as a tactic to incentivize executives to ward off a hostile
takeover in order to keep their position.  Of course, such arrangements
could also be designed to incentivize the executives to agree to the acquisi-
tion, assuming that was in the best interest of the corporation, regardless
of the executive’s self-interest.  Such arrangements were referred to as
“golden parachutes,” as they were apart from the typical severance ar-
rangements paid to executives, and instead paid enhanced severance ar-
rangements as a result of a change in control of the employer.24  Thus,
through the enactment of I.R.C. § 280G, Congress deemed that severance
payments in excess of three times base pay were “golden parachute pay-
ments” for purposes of the Code, and therefore would be nondeductible
to the employer—through I.R.C. § 280G—and result in a 20% excise tax
payable by the executive through I.R.C. § 4999.25
To no surprise to the benefits community, these changes caused a
variety of unintended consequences:
22. See Menard, Inc. v. Comm’r, 560 F.3d 620, 622–23 (7th Cir. 2009).  The
court held that although courts had tried to make uniform the multifactor reason-
able salary standard, it remained opaque and awkward in application. Id.  The
court found the standard lacking in providing a neutral basis for a judicial analysis.
Id. See generally Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008) (deciding
whether courts are best arbitrators as to what is reasonable compensation).
23. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 199 (Comm.
Print 1984).
24. See David P. Simonetti, Applying I.R.C. Section 280G’s Golden Parachute
Rules, J. OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION, Winter 2004, at 36 n.2.
25. See Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 67(a), 98 Stat. 494, 585
(adding § 280G to I.R.C.).  Since 1984, Congress used the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Reform and Consumer Protection Act to impose new cor-
porate governance initiatives. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
6
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• Three times base became the new parachute payment minimum for
most executives, thereby increasing the overall executive package;26
• Employers began to offer “tax gross-ups” as new benefits for execu-
tives—i.e., reimburse the executive for the additional excise taxes
due on the parachute payment—to lessen the blow for the execu-
tives;27 and
• Companies in danger of a takeover became more helpless and felt
compelled to offer larger compensation packages to compete, mak-
ing some companies more open to altering the date of the execu-
tive stock options (back-dating the option prior to the stock value
increase or post-dating the option in anticipation of a loss).28
Since the original passage, the use of parachute payments by boards
of directors has flipped—they now incentivize executives to welcome take-
overs, rather than resist them.29  But such use can be protective of execu-
tives who act in the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders
regarding a takeover.  The amount of such packages also continues to be
noticed by the public, especially in light of the economic turmoil, as four
highly profiled Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) could each receive para-
chute payments of $50 million or more, and four other CEOs could each
receive such packages of $30 million or more, as of November 2011.30
C. I.R.C. § 162(m)
In 1993, Congress again corralled the size of executive compensation
that could be paid with the enactment of subsection (m) to I.R.C. § 162.31
In an effort to tighten the tie between compensation and performance for
publicly held corporations,32 Congress imposed a $1 million cap on the
26. I.R.C. §§ 280G(a), (b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006); see also Richard P. Bress, Note,
Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955, 963 n.38 (1987).
27. Companies use this practice of tax gross-ups to give executives the same
compensation as if the executives were not assessed taxes/excise taxes on that in-
come.  See Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal?, 21 VA.
TAX REV. 125, 139–40 (2001) (noting full gross-up would include executive’s reim-
bursement for excise tax on golden parachute payments and taxes on gross-up).
28. See Glenn Curtis, A Close-Up on Gross Ups, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 18, 2007),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/07/gross-up.asp.
29. See Scott Thurm, Mergers Open “Golden Parachutes”, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204394804577010000947
986974.html.
30. See id.
31. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107
Stat. 312 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). See generally Lee A. Sheppard,
Big Paydays Are Back!, 124 TAX NOTES 99 (2009) (explaining first draft of § 162(m)
developed from cap on compensation to cap on employer deduction).  This pro-
gression occurred as a result of free market discussions. Id.
32. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 646 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
378, 877.  “[T]he amount of compensation received by corporate executives has
been the subject of scrutiny and criticism.  The committee believes that excessive
compensation will be reduced” by the cap to limit compensation. Id.
7
Kennedy: The Use of Federal Law to Curb Excessive Executive Compensation:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\57-3\VLR307.txt unknown Seq: 8 26-NOV-12 13:05
558 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57: p. 551
employer’s deduction for executive compensation that was not perform-
ance-based.33
Again the benefits community saw unintended consequences result-
ing from such legislation:
• Executives’ base salary of $1 million became the new standard as its
deductibility would not be questioned;34
• There began a real growth in stock option awards as they were con-
sidered to be performance-based;35 and
• Using stock option awards changed the executive’s perspective
from that of a long-term perspective based on the employer’s finan-
cial growth to that of a short-term perspective based on the changes
in employer stock.36
The Joint Committee of Taxation examined Enron’s executive compensa-
tion practices in the wake of that scandal.37  Enron had a pay-for-perform-
ance attitude toward executive compensation,38 relying heavily on the use
of stock options.  While most of the executives’ compensation was per-
formance-based, Enron did compensate a noteworthy amount of base pay
that was nondeductible because it exceeded the $1 million cap—in fact,
11% of compensation for executives was nondeductible.39  The Joint Com-
mittee concluded that Congress’s $1 million deduction cap did not accom-
plish its goal and in fact recommended its elimination.40  The Joint
Committee also affirmed that Congress should use non-tax laws to affect
executive compensation decisions.
Despite the Joint Committee’s response to I.R.C. § 162(m), the Ser-
vice continues to hone in on its utility.  While the initial regulations stated
that a compensation package would not fail to be performance-based sim-
ply because it allowed payouts upon death, disability, termination of em-
ployment, or retirement, regardless of whether the performance goals had
been met,41 the Service has proven more aggressive in a recent 2008 reve-
nue ruling by holding that payments upon death, disability, or termination
33. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006).
34. See John A. Bryne, That’s Some Pay Cap, Bill, BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 25, 1994),
http://www.businessweek.com/archives/1994/b336854.arc.htm.
35. See Sheppard, supra note 31, at 99 (“Some banks are remunerating their
employees with shares . . . .”).
36. See id. at 100 (“‘Some of the decisions that contributed to this crisis oc-
curred when people were able to earn immediate gains without their compensa-
tion reflecting the long-term risks they were taking for their companies and their
shareholders.’”).
37. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF
ENRON CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FED. TAX AND COMPENSA-
TION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 36 (Comm. Print 2003), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CPRT-JCS-3-03/pdf/GPO-CPRT-JCS-3-03-1-
1.pdf [hereinafter REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORP.].
38. Id. at 13.
39. Id. at 42.
40. Id. at 42–43.
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(iii)(C)(v) (1996).
8
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of employment prior to attainment of the performance goals would not be
deemed performance-based.42
Under the existing regulations, in the context of stock options or
SARs, the performance-based rule requires that the plan granting such
options or SARs set forth the maximum number of shares that may be
granted within a specified period to “any employee.”43  Proposed changes
made in 2011 to those regulations would require the plan to disclose the
maximum number of shares that may be granted per employee within a
specified period.44  Thus, disclosure of the aggregate amount of shares
that could be granted under the plan would no longer be sufficient.
D. I.R.C. § 409A
Also regarding the Enron scandal, there were reports that Enron ex-
ecutives were able to dip into their deferred compensation arrange-
ments45 and accelerate the payment of such amounts—through the use of
“haircut” provisions, which resulted in a forfeiture of a portion of the
amounts—at the very time the stock value was plummeting, and the retire-
ment benefits of the typical Enron employee, invested in company stock,
were losing value.  Thus, as part of the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 409A, which severely limits the ability of
an executive to defer compensation under a nonqualified arrangement.46
The focus now was not on the amount of the compensation, but the type of
compensation—deferred compensation.  Instead of punishing the em-
ployer with the loss of a deduction, failure to comply with the rules results
in immediate taxation of the deferred amounts and a 20% excise tax to
the executive.47
42. Rev. Rul. 2008-13, 2008-10 I.R.B. 518.
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (1006).  This is referred to as “Indi-
vidual Limitation.”
44. Id. § 1.162-27(e)(4)(iv). See generally Andrew L. Oringer & Steven W.
Rabitz, Deducting from Flexibility under § 162(m)—New Proposed Treasury Regulations
Released, 39 TAX MGMT. COMPENSATION PLAN. J. 179 (2011).
45. See Eric Berger & Mary Flood, The Fall of Enron: Deferred Payments Under Fire,
HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 17, 2002, at C1, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/
archives/archive.mpl/2002_3573528/the-fall-of-enron-deferred-payments-under-
fire-han.html (noting that $32 million in deferred compensation was paid in Octo-
ber and November 2000 to Enron executives, still employed by Enron); see also
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORP., supra note 37, at 13–14.
46. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).  Note that some authors argue that
the passage of I.R.C. § 409A was driven by tax policy, arguing that deferred com-
pensation receives more favorable tax treatment than current cash compensation
and investments. See Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of De-
ferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571, 573 n.7 (2007). See generally Daniel I.
Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of Money”, 95 YALE L.J. 506
(1986).
47. I.R.C. § 404A(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
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The regulations took years to develop and resulted in onerous and
detailed rules for compliance.48  A correction program was announced in
late 2008 to correct a limited number of operational failures.49
While it is too early to predict the unintended consequences, the on-
erous and complicated rules, coupled with the severe tax consequences to
the executives, may result in the curtailment or elimination of deferred
compensation.  While that may have been Congress’s ultimate goal, de-
ferred compensation does align the executive’s self-interest with the long-term finan-
cial health of the employer, as he/she is dependent on that employer to make the
payment sometime in the distant future.  Similar to the changes made to I.R.C.
§ 162(m), executives’ focus on short-term changes in the employer’s
stock—which results in using stock options—may not be in the long-term
best interest of the financial health of the employer.
E. I.R.C. § 457A
Hidden within the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) legislation
was yet another example of congressional intent to further limit deferred
compensation by executives through the passage of I.R.C. § 457A.50  Again
the focus was on the type of executive compensation—deferred compensa-
tion.  Originally, it was targeted to limit the deferred compensation of
hedge fund managers—sheltered in offshore tax jurisdictions—by subject-
ing such deferrals to taxation upon vesting.  Nevertheless, the final terms
of the provision were more expansive in order to act as a revenue en-
hancer to negate tax extenders within the bill.51
Normally under the Code, the employer’s deduction for deferred
compensation is postponed until the employee reports the compensation
as income, referred to as the “matching” principle.52  For a typical U.S.
employer, the tax rules do not incentivize the employer to defer the pay-
ment of employee compensation, as the deduction is also deferred.  How-
ever, there may be no similar rule in the context of a foreign employer.
Thus, such employers may be happy to allow deferrals by executives since
48. Application of Section 409A to Nonqualified Deferred Compensation
Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 19,234, 19,278 (Apr. 17, 2007) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt.
1).  The deadline for complete compliance was postponed until December 31,
2008. See I.R.S. Notice 07-86, 2007-2 C.B. 990.
49. See I.R.S. Notice 2010-6, 2010-3 I.R.B. 275, available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-drop/n-10-06.pdf.
50. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765 (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.); see I.R.S. Notice 09-8, 2009-4
I.R.B. 34; I.R.S. Notice 8-115, 2008-2 C.B. 1367.
51. I.R.C. § 457A(a) (West Supp. 2009).  Although the TARP legislation offers
several ways of delaying the payment of taxes, the legislation has offset this by cre-
ating other revenue measures. Id.  It was estimated that the arrival of I.R.C. § 457A
would generate between $24 and $26 billion in revenue over the scoring period.
Id.
52. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (2006); see also Albertson’s, Inc. v. Comm’r, 42 F.3d
537, 541 (9th Cir. 1994).
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there is no tax consequence to the employer.  I.R.C. § 457A subjects com-
pensation deferred under a nonqualified plan of a nonqualified entity to
immediate taxation when such compensation is no longer subject to a sub-
stantial risk of forfeiture.53  If such amounts are not ascertainable as of the
date of vesting, such amounts become includible in income when they are
ascertainable, with a potential 20% excise tax plus interest imposed.54
I.R.C. § 457A shows Congress’s continued dislike of deferred compen-
sation arrangements and its continued use of the Code as a method to
affect corporate governance.  It is certainly too soon to predict whether
this section will also produce unintended consequences.
IV. USE OF FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
A. Introduction
In the aftermath of the WorldCom and Enron outrage, Congress
turned to federal securities law in 2002 as another tool to regulate corpo-
rate governance, using the Securities Act of 193355 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.56  As the federal securities laws were designed as full-
disclosure laws for publicly traded entities, Congress decided to use those
disclosure rules to spotlight and direct the actions of boards of directors of
publicly held corporations.  In 2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation (“SOX”),57 requiring publicly held corporations to create inde-
pendent audit committees and to mandate certain responsibilities for such
committees.58
Through this legislation, the audit committee was to have meaningful
control over the audit process,59 and the ability to hire financial advisors
and special counsel as needed.60  The CEO and the Chief Financial Of-
ficer (“CFO”) must now certify that all reportable financial disclosures are
accurate and dependable.61
53. I.R.C. §§ 409A(d), 457A.
54. See id. § 457A(c)(1).
55. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(s) (2006).
56. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (2008).
57. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343).
58. Id. § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l) (mandating SEC to announce new
rules to clarify role and structure of corporate audit committees).
59. Id. § 301(m)(2) (“The audit committee of each issuer, in its capacity as a
committee of the board of directors, shall be directly responsible for the appoint-
ment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any registered public account-
ing firm employed by that issuer . . . for the purpose of preparing or issuing an
audit report or related work, and each such registered public accounting firm shall
report directly to the audit committee.”).
60. Id. § 301(m)(5).
61. Id. § 302.  The purpose of this rule is to make certain that the flow of
information is reliable and complete through the company’s controls. Id.
11
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SOX’s accomplishment can be credited with the ability “to get audi-
tors to start being auditors again.”62  But what benefits practitioners saw in
SOX was a model that Congress would ultimately use in drafting future
legislation.
B. SEC Regulation
Then in 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) used
its powers under the Securities Act of 1933 to propose new disclosure
rules, which honed in on the various components of executive compensa-
tion packages.63  These included:
• A narrative in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (the
“CD&A”), which focused on the CEO, CFO, and top three execu-
tive officers, and would describe new executive and director com-
pensation disclosures, including tables that listed the various
compensation components and their totals;64
• Additional disclosure rules for describing stock option programs,
plans, and practices, with the table disclosing grant dates, grant fair
market value, whether the exercise price of the option differed
from the closing price on grant date, and the particulars of the tim-
ing of the grants;65
• Additional disclosure as to independence of directors and ex-
panded disclosure around related person transactions;66
62. Joseph Nocera, For All Its Cost, Sarbanes Law is Working, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2005, at C1. But see Robert Cole and Reynolds Holding, Buffett Makes a Value-
Growth Bet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at B1 (noting 2009 survey by SEC stated
average cost per employer of complying with law was about $2.3 million per year).
63. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg.
53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 245,
249, 274) (describing significant adjustments made to rules in December 2006
which helped equity compensation disclosures conform with financial statements
reported pursuant to Financial Account Standards Bulletin (FASB)); see also Execu-
tive Compensation, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2008).  These disclosure rules are ex-
pected to influence plan design since the limitations of the plan will be published
for public consumption; therefore, these disclosure rules are often referred to as
“the tail wagging the dog.”
64. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to
Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and Related Mat-
ters (July 26, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.
htm.  The CD&A requires the company’s CEO and CFO to file and certify the
disclosure form. Id.  The disclosure form was initially intended to give details
about the compensation packages for the organization’s Chief Executive Officer,
Chief Financial Officer, and the three other most highly compensated executive
officers. Id.
65. Id.  Equity interests were tabulated showing awards that could be received
in the future and “the amount of securities underlying exercisable and unex-
ercisable options, the exercise prices and the expiration dates for each outstanding
option . . . .” Id.
66. Id.  The amendment increased the dollar threshold for transaction disclo-
sures, required disclosure of related company policies and procedures, and speci-
fied exceptions for certain categories of transactions. Id.
12
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• Required disclosure of the number of shares pledged by
management;67
• Required Form 8-K description of employment agreements and their
amendments;68
• All disclosures to be in “plain English;”69
• More extensive disclosure requirements for registered investment
and business development companies;70 and
• An additional compliance portion, which describes the triggering
events and time frame of these new disclosure rules.71
The notion was to spotlight disclosure of the specifics of the top execu-
tives’ employment arrangements and pay packages to elicit responses from
the general public and institutional investors who had significant owner-
ship interest in the employers.  As the SEC was dissatisfied with the results
of such enhanced disclosures, it later modified its proposals.72
C. SEC Proposed Corporate Governance Initiatives
By July 2009, the SEC altered its proxy disclosure requirements, now
examining whether the company’s compensation arrangements in gen-
eral—going outside the packages of the CEO, CFO, and the top executive
officers—put the company at risk, and if so, how the company would han-
dle such risk.73  It specifically proposed that the board’s Compensation
Committee evaluate all compensation arrangements, not only for the size
and the type of compensation, but also as to the risk they could pose to the
employer’s financial health.74  This was obviously a reaction to the finan-
67. Id.  Also, “the inclusion of directors’ qualifying shares in the total amount
of securities owned” needs to be disclosed. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 35,076
(July 17, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 270, and 274).
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro stated:
The Commission will be considering whether greater disclosure is
needed about how a company—and the company’s board in particular—
manages risks, both generally and in the context of setting compensation.
I do not anticipate that we will seek to mandate any particular form of
oversight; not only is this really beyond the Commission’s traditional dis-
closure role, but it would suggest that there is a one-size-fits-all approach
to risk management.
Instead, I have asked our staff to develop a proposal for Commission
consideration that looks to providing investors, and the market, with bet-
ter insight into how each company and each board addresses these vital
tasks.
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to the Council of
Institutional Investors (Apr. 6 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2009/spch040609mls.htm.
73. Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at
35,077–78.
74. Id.
13
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cial meltdown during 2008 during which certain compensation arrange-
ments allowed executives to take excessive risks, subjecting the
corporation and its shareholders to greater vulnerability.
In addition, the SEC made specific recommendations with respect to
corporate governance issues.75  Four new areas of corporate governance
that were being proposed included:
• Disclosure as to whether the board’s Compensation Committee was
operating under any conflict of interest76—that is, to the extent
outside consultants were being utilized by the Committee, what fees
were being paid to such consultants from the employer in total,
management’s contribution in appointing these consultants, and
whether the board or Compensation Committee consented to the
use of these consultants for other services;77
• Disclosure regarding the unique qualification, knowledge, and
practice-set of individuals recommended to be board members;78
• Disclosure as to the corporation’s leadership structure (asking the
question as to whether the CEO could also be the chairman of the
board);79 and
• Disclosure regarding the board’s responsibility in engaging in risk
analysis, not only with respect to compensation levels, but also in
general.80
D. TARP
The meltdown in the financial sector during 2008 set the stage for the
Administration and Congress to set forth a new regime of regulation for
those companies that would receive public aid through the Capital
Purchase Program (“CPP”) formed under TARP, which was created under
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA).81  Initially,
75. Id.  Additionally, the new proposed SEC requirements would require com-
panies to report the full grant date fair value of stock and options in the year of the
grant. Id. at 35,079.
76. Id. at 35,086.
77. Id. at 35,108.
78. Id. at 35,105.
79. Id. at 35,108. See Matthew G. Isakson, Meridian Compensation Partners,
LLC, 2011 Corporate Governance & Incentive Design Survey 5 (2011), available at
http://www.meridiancp.com/images/uploads/Meridian_2011_Governance_and_
Design_Survey_Results.pdf (surveying 250 large publicly traded companies and
finding about one-third of such companies separated role between CEO and chair-
man of board).  When such roles were separated, in the majority of cases, the non-
CEO Chairman was also an independent director. Id.
80. See Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at
35,076–78, 35,108.
81. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, 26, and 31 U.S.C.); see also
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Agencies Encourage Par-
ticipation in Treasury’s Capital Purchase Program, FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity
Guarantee Program (Oct. 20, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
14
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nine banks82 used the resources available through the legislation.  The
TARP requirements were viewed as a preview of what the government was
prepared to impose on the vast number of publicly held corporations.83
For TARP participants, the government subjected executive compensation
to four new restrictions:
• The I.R.C. § 162(m) deduction of $1 million was lowered to
$500,000 for any Senior Executive Officer (“SEO”)—defined as the
top five highly paid executives whose compensation is subject to
SEC proxy disclosure rules—for any year that the company contin-
ued to receive TARP money, not only for base pay but also for per-
formance-based compensation;84
• Several of the § 162(m) exclusions were eliminated or paired
down;85
newsevents/press/bcreg/20081020a.htm.  The Secretary of the Treasury gained
authority from EESA to re-establish the financial markets and “to purchase, and to
make and fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any financial insti-
tution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by the Secretary, and in
accordance with this Act and the policies and procedures developed and pub-
lished by the Secretary.”  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
§ 101(a)(1).  TARP recipients now had corporate governance and executive com-
pensation limits under Section 111 of the EESA. Id. at § 111(b)(2)(A).  EESA was
modified and replaced on February 17, 2009 by the enactment of § 7001 of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which prescribed new
executive compensation limits and required the Treasury to publish regulations to
implement section 111 of EESA. Id.; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 sec. 7001, § 111(a)(2) (amending 12 U.S.C.
§ 5221(a)(2)).
82. Citigroup, JPMorgan, Wells Fargo, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley,
Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, and State Street
Bank were the banks participating in TARP.
83. See Stephanie L. Soondar & Allen Major, Litigation and Recoupment of Execu-
tive Compensation, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 397, 399 (2010).  The Department of Trea-
sury stated that the implementation of TARP was within “the ultimate goal of
systemic regulatory reform” and was part of an investigation into “how corporate
governance regulation can be improved to better promote long-term economic
growth and to prevent future financial crises.” Id.; see also Jonathan G. Katz, Who
Benefited from the Bailout?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1568, 1569 (2011).  The money dis-
bursed by TARP was “merely one component of a much larger governmental inter-
vention . . . .” Id.; Lisa M. Fairfax, The Legal Origins Theory in Crisis, 2009 BYU L.
REV. 1571, 1595 (2009) (stating that Treasury Regulations associated with receiving
TARP funds were in step with President Obama’s plan to “‘promote systemic regu-
latory reform’”).
84. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 302(a) (amending
I.R.C. § 162(m)) (defining special Rule for Application to Employers Participating
in TARP).  Congress may be wary of using performance–based compensation as
the measure for performance since it can be easily met, which is evident by not
including a performance based compensation exception in EESA. See id.
85. Id.; see I.R.C. § 162(m)(5)(D)(i)-(iii) (West 2011).  Once an executive is
identified and meets the qualifications for a “covered executive” for any applicable
year, that individual is considered to be a “covered executive” in all subsequent tax
years. Id.  This is true regardless if the executive meets the requirements of “cov-
ered executive” in future years. Id.
15
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• The amount of any golden parachute payment86 payable to a SEO
or any of the next five most highly compensated employees87—not
just simply a limit on the employer’s deduction—would be limited
to three times the base pay,88 and the scope of the compensation
for such payments was expanded to include any payment for depar-
ture (1) due to involuntary termination or (2) as a result of the
employer’s bankruptcy, liquidation, or receivership;89 and
• The ability to rebut the presumption that arrangements made
within the last year were parachute payments was eliminated.90
The TARP legislation ushered in the following new corporate governance
requirements:
• For the SEOs,91 the Compensation Committee would be mandated
to examine the SEO incentive compensation packages to make sure
that such packages would not promote unwarranted risk-taking on
their part, and if so, to alter such packages;92
• SEO compensation arrangements must now afford the company
the ability to “clawback” bonuses/awards that later were found to
be ill-gotten as the company’s “statements of earnings, gains, or
other criteria” were “materially inaccurate;”93 and
• Subsequent golden parachute arrangements for the SEOs that
would be triggered upon an involuntary termination, bankruptcy,
insolvency, or receivership could not be entered into.94
86. The definition of a parachute payment is any compensation payment that
was or is “(i) . . . contingent on a change (I) in the ownership or effective control
of the corporation, or (II) in the ownership of a substantial portion of the assets of
the corporation, and (ii) the aggregate present value of payments [which] ex-
ceeds” three times the recipient’s “base amount.” I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A) (West
2006).
87. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 111(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat.
3765, 3776-77 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, 26, and 31 U.S.C.).
88. In determining the base amount, one takes the executive’s annualized
includible compensation averaged over the five calendar years determined prior to
the change of control year. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(3) (West 2008).
89. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 §111(b)(2)-(3) (barring
any SEO from receiving golden parachute when Treasury retains equity or debt
position in employer).
90. I.R.C. §§ 280G(b)(2)(C), (e)(1)(D).
91. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111(b)(3).
92. Id. § 111(b)(2)(A).  There is no definition of “risk” or “excessive risk” in
the legislation.  Typically risk is considered as an anticipated harm that could re-
sult in attempting a given objective, a balancing of risks versus rewards.  Although
EESA does not disallow using risk as a criterion in determining compensation, it
disallows excessive risk-taking. See Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter
of Auditors Under the PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1131 (2007) (explaining “risk-
and-rewards” method in general business context as “estimation of expected losses
and returns”).
93. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111(b)(2)(B).
94. Id. § 111(c).  Additionally, covered employers are barred from giving any
golden parachute payments to the five highest paid executives who are under ex-
isting arrangements. Id.
16
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As Congress viewed itself as a major shareholder of these banks, it decided
to not only limit the employer’s deduction, but to set the size and type of
existing, as well as new, executive compensation arrangements.
E. TARP II
One of the original TARP participants, Merrill Lynch, decided to ad-
vance certain bonus payments to executives beginning in January of 2009,
prior to its sale to Bank of America.95  The Administration and the Trea-
sury Department issued press releases in early February setting forth even
more rigorous limitations on the executive compensation programs of
TARP recipients.96
This set the stage for Congress to pass the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 200997 (ARRA) on February 17, rewriting the prior
TARP restrictions on executive compensation and imposing new require-
ments.  While these new rules were applicable only to companies receiving
TARP funds (both financial and nonfinancial corporations), they caught
the attention of most publicly traded corporations in the event such limita-
tions would one day become universal.  The changes included:
• Clawback provisions were to be imposed not only on the SEOs, but
also on the next twenty most highly compensated employees;98
• A new prohibition existed against “paying or accruing any bonus,
retention award, or incentive compensation” for certain SEOs while
the company was the recipient of TARP monies;99
• A new requirement that the company institute policies regarding
excessive or luxury perquisites;100
95. See Rick Newman, More Outrage over the Merrill Bonuses, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT (Mar. 12, 2009), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/flow
chart/2009/03/12/more-outrage-over-the-merrill-bonuses (describing bonus pay-
ments to Merrill Lynch executives).  Newman describes it as:
[A] crystallizing episode in the Great Financial Meltdown.  To most
Americans, it’s absurd for a company that lost nearly $28 billion in 2008,
nearly collapsed, and survived thanks only to a taxpayer-subsidized res-
cue, to lavish million-dollar bonuses on dozens of executives. . . .
This can only end badly for Merrill and BofA, with repercussions that
could ricochet throughout Wall Street and dramatically change estab-
lished practices.
Id.
96. See Macon Phillips, New Rules, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb 4, 2009, 2:51
PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/new_rules.
97. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
98. Id. sec. 7001, § 111(b)(3)(B) (amending 12 U.S.C. §5221(b)(3)(B)).
99. Id. sec. 7001, § 111(b)(3)(D)(i).
100. Id. sec. 7001, § 111(d)(1)–(4).  These luxury expenses include: “(1) en-
tertainment or events; (2) office and facility renovations; (3) aviation or other
transportation services; or (4) other activities or events” to the extent that those
expenditures “are not reasonable expenditures for staff development, reasonable
performance incentives, or other similar measures conducted in the normal
course of the business . . . .” Id.
17
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• A new requirement that the Compensation Committee perform a
semiannual review of the executive compensation arrangements to
evaluate risk, along with certifications and disclosure narratives;101
• A new requirement for shareholder say-on-pay vote on the compen-
sation of executives in the annual proxy statement102—while non-
binding, a negative vote was hoped to carry weight and result in
changed corporate behavior;103 and
• The creation of a “Special Master” (i.e., the new pay czar), who
would review the compensation packages of seven of the TARP re-
cipients receiving “exceptional assistance” and make recommenda-
tions accordingly.104
V. DODD-FRANK PASSAGE IN 2010
The series of TARP legislations certainly provided the template for
the Administration and Congress to extend many of the TARP restrictions
to all publicly held companies through the passage of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act in 2010.105  By amending
the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 and adding a new Section 14, publicly
held companies would now be subject to the following new requirements:
• The shareholder say-on-pay initiative would now be universal for
publicly held companies beginning with the 2011 proxy season.106
While the vote would be non-binding, shareholders would be given
the right to vote on executive pay packages for the named executive
officers, as well as the right to vote on the frequency of such vote.107
The say-on-pay vote was also extended to the offering of any golden
parachute packages requested in the event of an acquisition,
merger, consolidation, or sale of assets of the reporting company
that would occur within six months;108
101. Id. sec. 7001, § 111(c)(2).
102. Id. sec. 7001, § 111(e).
103. See TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74
Fed. Reg. 28,394 (June 15, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30).  The Interim
Final Rule “revises in its entirety 31 CFR [sic] Part 30, which comprises Treasury’s
regulations implementing section 111 of EESA.” Id. at 28,396.
104. Id. at 28,416.
105. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
106. Id. sec. 951, § 14A(a)(1); see Jeff Green, America’s Teflon Corporate Boards,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 14, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/maga-
zine/americas-teflon-corporate-boards-07142011.html (noting that in past three
years, more than 200 directors received negative say-on-pay votes, but continued in
leadership roles).
107. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 951,
§ 14A(a)(2).  Shareholders can elect to hold a vote on executives’ compensation
every one, two, or three years. Id.
108. Id. sec. 951, § 14A(b)(2).
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• Enhanced independence standards would be imposed on the Com-
pensation Committee of the board109 and its use of independence
factors in selecting and using outside compensation consultants
and other advisors;110
• All publicly traded companies would be required to have clawback
policies in order to recover from former or existing executive of-
ficers in the event the financial statements had to be restated for
material noncompliance with securities law;111 and
• New disclosures on the proxy summarizing the pay packages of any
named executive officer of the company and the size of the pack-
age, including comparing the CEO’s pay to the pay of the average
employee (the so-called “internal pay equity”) and the CEO’s pay to
total pay of all employees (excluding the CEO’s pay).112
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of the Code in curbing the size and type of executive com-
pensation has not only been unsuccessful, but has also created unintended
consequences that contributed to the growth of executive pay.  It has also
led to more complexity in the Code, adding to the cost of complying and
auditing such provisions.  As Congress directs its corporate governance
mandates under federal securities law, its reach is obviously limited to pub-
licly traded corporations.  Undoubtedly, it hopes that such mandates will
become “best practices” for all businesses.  This is undoubtedly a huge
leap of faith for small businesses that struggle with low profit margins with
a small group of insiders that are employed and control the business.
It is too early to tell whether the use of federal securities law will be
successful in legislating corporate governance “best practices” for publicly
traded corporations.  The 2010 Wall Street Journal/Hay Group CEO Com-
pensation Study saw little change in the median CEO base salary amount,
but did see a shift in the long-term incentive portfolio away from stock
options to a mixture of stock options, restricted stock, and performance
awards.113  As to executives’ perquisites, the only fade away has been tax
gross-ups.  The results of the 2011 proxy season showed that the vast ma-
jority of employers received favorable say-on-pay votes regarding executive
compensation,114 indicating either a strong endorsement of executives’
pay packages or apathy on the part of shareholders.
109. Id. sec. 952, § 10C(a)(2).
110. Id. sec. 952, § 10C(b)(2).
111. Id. sec. 954, § 10D(b)(1).
112. Id. sec. 953(a)–(b) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78n).
113. The Wall Street Journal/Hay Group Survey of CEO Compensation, supra note 7.
114. See Matt Vnuk et al., 2011 Proxy Season Summary—Say on Pay, CAPFLASH
NEWSLETTER  (Compensation Advisory Partners, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 13, 2011, at
2, available at http://www.capartners.com/uploads/news/id64/capartners.com-
capflash-issue22.pdf.
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As Congress encroaches on the States’ traditional police powers to
regulate corporate governance issues, it will continue to find resistance
from business entities and executives, as well as the federal courts, as they
query federal mandates in such areas that normally would be perceived to
be within the States’ traditional police powers.  A similar fight between the
lines of federal mandates and States’ traditional police powers—which in-
clude insurance regulation—is being waged in the recent health care re-
form legislation, as health insurance has been typically regarded as within
the purview of the States’ traditional police powers.  How far federal legis-
lative powers can extend to regulate individuals’ and corporations’ abili-
ties to receive compensation and benefits will be the subject of continued
debate for decades to come.
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